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europe inside out 
 
In light of the Government’s move to a zonal system, Sebastian Dembski and Phil O’Brien 
review the experience of three European countries based on a recent report for the Scottish 
Land Commission 
 
the myth of zoning – the European experience 
 
The planning system is frequently made the culprit of all that goes wrong in English 
planning, in particular the housing crisis. The current comments/proposals by the 
government, recently brought to attention by Dominic Cummings’ description of it as 
‘appalling’, are just the latest in a series of ill-defined reforms.1 None has succeeded in 
delivering more housing than under the previous system. The latest iteration aims to 
“rethink planning from first principles”, as announced by Secretary of State for Housing, 
Communities & Local Government Robert Jenrick in June this year.2 At the heart of the 
reform is a zonal planning system that provides direct building rights to proposed 
developments that comply with the zoning code, inspired by the US. The main argument is 
that such a system is faster and better.  
The government proposals have been met with instant criticism in the world of 
planning. The RTPI’s Chief Executive, Victoria Hills, responded that “dismantling [the current 
discretionary planning system] completely in favour of a zoning system will not result in 
faster permissions or better development” and called local planning zones a “blunt 
instrument”.3 The TCPA’s policy director, Hugh Ellis, presented the debate between a zonal 
system as a “straight trade off between certainty and democracy”.4  
While the Planning White Paper announced in March this year has not been 
published as of now, it is worthwhile reflecting on the zoning practices in Europe. The 
Universities of Glasgow and Liverpool recently carried out work for the Scottish Land 
Commission, studying housing land allocation, assembly and delivery in three European 
countries: Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. One of the problems around the 
debate in England is a fundamental misunderstanding of how zonal systems such as these 
elsewhere in Europe work – not only on paper, but also in practice.  
Often a distinction is being made between ‘conforming’ planning systems in which 
development rights are assigned in binding land use plans in advance according to a long-
term spatial strategy, and ‘performing’ planning systems, in which development rights are 
evaluated on their merits in line with non-binding policy. The former is often associated 
with zoning. The UK’s discretionary planning system clearly belongs to the latter category of 
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performing planning systems and has long been an exception in Europe.5 This dichotomy, 
however, is too simple and neglects the practice in many European countries, where land 
use plans are negotiated between stakeholders and can therefore be considered ‘neo-
performative’.6  
Conformative planning systems as imagined by planners familiar with discretionary 
planning systems probably never existed in their purest form. Germany intended to create 
such a system in the 1960s, but it remained partial. Detailed land use plans are nowadays 
almost exclusively drafted in response to proposed development. The same is true for the 
Netherlands, where a conformative system was practiced, but given that the municipalities 
were often also the landowners and the majority of housing was delivered by housing 
associations, conformance was rarely put to the test. Land use planning effectively occurred 
through land banking.7 While in Switzerland municipal zoning plans provide planning 
permission to landowners directly, the municipality also has had powers to designate sites 
requiring more detailed land use plans.  
Municipalities in these countries make ample use of their planning powers to deliver 
housing that is affordable and good. The crux is when and under what conditions planning 
permission is given and on what grounds these can be contested. In all three countries, it is 
possible that a development is permissible if it conforms to the provisions of the land use 
plan, which will at the least regulate the use class and building heights. Binding land use 
plans often cover only a fraction of the built-up area and development projects are 
“permissible where, in terms of the type and scale of use for building, the coverage type and 
the plot area to be built on, the building proposal blends with the characteristic features of 
its immediate environment and the provision of local public infrastructure has been 
secured”.8 Conversely, however, it means that any larger project requires a land use plan. 
And it is here that the UK and neo-performative planning systems differ. Whereas a UK 
developer can lodge an appeal and is incentivised to do so in seeking a larger profit, no such 
opportunity exists in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland: the municipality is obliged 
to permit development that is in line with the existing land use plan or regulations, but it 
cannot be forced to amend its land use plan to enable a proposed development project. 
Discretion is thus a relative concept, depending on the specific stage in the planning process 
analysed.  
Municipalities in these countries use these powers to negotiate the parameters of 
development, including developer contributions. The municipality and the developer will 
usually team up, and despite potentially diverging interests, work collaboratively. For larger 
or important sites, most municipalities will require a design competition incorporating 
municipal as well as developer aspirations. It is common practice that a developer provides 
local public infrastructure at the specification of the municipality or where the municipality 
insist on delivering this, pays for it, and returns it into municipal ownership afterwards.  
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This process is as challenging as a planning application in the UK and the process 
takes at least a year from start to finish, though usually much longer. Like any planning 
application in the UK, the detailed land use plans will be subject to public scrutiny, with 
stakeholders, including the general public, bringing forward their legitimate concerns. Legal 
appeals are usually launched by those affected by the plan, not developers. In Switzerland, 
land use plans often require approval under the rules of direct democracy, meaning public 
concerns need to be taken seriously.  
Zoning plans such as these are not faster, certainly not for the large-scale schemes 
that the government has in mind for its zoning plans. They may provide more certainty than 
an outline planning permission but will equally include detailed provisions. It also enables 
local authorities to ensure minimum standards in terms of design and materials without 
risking an appeal from developers. There is also no possibility to use discretion once the 
plan is approved without amending the plan, meaning there is little flexibility.  
As Hugh Ellis remarked, “there is nothing inherently good or bad about zonal 
planning”, as there is nothing inherently good or bad about discretionary planning.9 It 
appears not unlikely that government’s preference would be for a ‘light touch’ zonal system 
in which a limited range of land use categories are used to set out permitted uses and 
characteristics of development. But the outcomes of such a planning system would need to 
be evaluated in their totality, rather than simply in their effect on increasing completions. A 
recent Centre for Cities report draws lessons from the Japanese planning system, in which 
simple zoning rules are held to create planning certainty for developers such that they are 
able to respond to market signals more effectively.10 Yet if such a system were to be 
effective in Britain on these terms, would the sort of built environment that results accord 
with society’s preferences? Tokyo’s house price growth is impressively restrained as 
compared to London’s, but its sprawling suburbs and excessive commuting times are less 
admirable, while its disordered suburban development, ‘with an extreme form of 
haphazard, unplanned growth’ lies in stark contrast to the prized stability of the British 
suburb.11 If a societal consensus is to be reached as to the need to build more houses, 
communities must be brought onside regarding the sort of new development they see in 
their area. Moreover, the costs of sprawl are no more to be underestimated, simply because 
they fall on society as a whole rather than on any individual, than are the costs of 
insufficient housing.  
Is there a way to deliver new homes in sufficient numbers within developments that 
accord to societal preference? Britain has achieved this in the past in the earlier New Towns, 
while there are lessons to be drawn from our near neighbours, where the Netherlands in 
particular is able to meet housing need through developments that largely accord to British 
preference. A key reason underlying this is not that developers are necessarily more free to 
act as they please in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, but that a great deal of 
developer risk has been removed from the development process by the reduction in land 
values that follows from the imposition of high standards of planning and urban design. 
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Because housebuilders expect to be challenged by local authorities to build to a high 
standard, they are able to incorporate these anticipated demands into their land valuations, 
in the same way that British developers do with planning obligations. Where planning is 
more able to determine the form taken by development, public and private sectors can 
work more effectively, not less, and windfall land value gains can be redirected more 
efficiently towards high quality development.  
Would a simpler zonal system lower land values, which are a major inhibition to 
development in the South East of England? Assuming that all areas are of more or less equal 
accessibility and quality, making more land available for development would introduce 
competition into the land market and thereby lower prices. But as every housebuilder 
knows from the experience of encountering local plans where only the least attractive sites 
are allocated, what land is developable at a profit is determined by the market as well as the 
plan. Consequently, sufficiently profitable sites around high pressure cities will maintain 
much of their value under a light touch zonal system, simply because the most important 
component determining their price – their location and its accessibility – would remain 
unaltered. It is public investments in infrastructure and services rather than public action to 
allocate more land for development that would be more effective in increasing the quantity 
of land available for development. In fact, when rules governing development are set early 
in the development process, at the point at which the land use plan is drawn up, land values 
rise accordingly, with two negative effects.12 First, a major inhibition to development – the 
tendency of landowners not to sell for fear of losing out on further land value increase as 
development pressure continues to rise – is exacerbated. Second, the power of the local 
planning authority to use the award of planning permission as a trump card in negotiations 
over the provision of public goods, is lost.  
A zonal system is likely to provide more legal certainty and has the potential to 
deliver high-quality schemes, but it is unlikely to be faster unless the government removes 
any public scrutiny from planning. The point is perhaps not whether a planning system is 
zonal or discretionary, but whether it avoids making what is a false choice between delivery 
of new homes by any means possible and matching society’s needs and preferences.  
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